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This paper presents the perspective that the purpose of foundations is not simply to engage in 
grant making, but rather to invest in the creation of social value.  The idea is also presented that 
available foundation assets for supporting this process of social value creation should be viewed 
as not simply its grant making ability, but its overall investment strategy for both core assets and 
philanthropic investments. A strategy for achieving maximum social impact—The Unified 
Investment Strategy—is presented, and the implications of that strategy are discussed.  The 
paper’s appendix includes an extended discussion by two foundation trustees regarding the 
question of fiduciary responsibility.   
 
 
The Purpose of this Paper 
 
While this paper is the product of significant thought and reflection on the part of a 
number of people, it is not offered simply in the spirit of objective analysis and 
foundation strategy. This paper is offered in the spirit of a passion for change.   
 
The practices and values of the past are not to be disregarded. History, however, is 
known; what lies ahead is unknown.  While the practices of the past should be honored, 
they must also be built upon and improved. Significant achievements are attained when 
the vision driven by history’s actors is combined with our ambition to achieve the 
absolute best within us all.  It is this passion to push, to achieve, and to improve upon 
what we create that will constitute the true measure of our lives’ work. 
 
This paper is offered in the belief that we are called upon not simply to manage our 
financial and intellectual assets, but to apply ourselves in continual improvement of our 
communities and world. The tools at hand—companies, non-governmental organizations, 
foundations, and public sector entities—are dynamic. The capital sources of talent, 
nature, and finance stand ready. What remains to be addressed is our own willingness to 
innovate and embrace emerging visions of what evolved institutions can become.   
 
This paper is intended as a jumping-off point for discussions regarding the effectiveness 
of leveraging various investment strategies which, when taken together, hold the promise 
of leaving our children and their children the same thing that was promised to us:  
 
 
That we might excel and achieve our best, while in the process 
contributing to the creation of thriving, sustainable communities 
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Beginning with the Potlatches held by the Indians of the Pacific Northwest and continued 
by settlers of the New Frontier through the practice of community barn raisings, 
Americans have always engaged in giving of themselves.  We have done this in the belief 
that it is the right thing to do—in the name of community, in the name of personal 
integrity, and in the name of God.  Yet our relationship with the concept and practice of 
philanthropy has been a complex one, with the values of selfless giving and charity at 
play next to notions of “the deserving poor” and the general perception of a separation 
between the interests of commerce and community.   
 
Take, for example, the creator of the modern foundation, John D. Rockefeller. He was a 
constant and conscientious practitioner of charitable acts at the same time that 
representatives of his own corporation were firing weapons at the families of miners on 
strike in Colorado. We cannot really understand the specifics of how Mr. Rockefeller 
managed this seeming contradiction. What is clear, however, is that while committed to 
charity and justice, Americans have always struggled with how best to balance social 
interests with those of business. 
 
Historically, Americans have handled this tension by creating a dividing wall between 
“doing good” and “doing well.” People have generally assumed that while in the process 
of “doing business” during the week, they should not take into serious account the 
interests of community or the environment.  Rather, such concerns should be addressed 
naturally through “the market” or during one’s personal time. Or, better yet, such 
concerns should be left to the efforts of others who are drawn to “the cause,” however 
defined.   
 
One could write a strong historical defense of this arrangement.  And in many ways, this 
philanthropic equivalent of the “separation of church and state” has served the nation 
well.  The United States is arguably the most successful experiment in democracy and 
individual initiative the world has ever seen.  One may, quite literally, start a company in 
the garage behind one’s house that ultimately sparks revolutions in both business and 
technology that profoundly alter people’s lives.  For many individuals, this drive to create 
and contribute is a central reason for living.  Many of this nation's finest companies and 
small businesses have been lead by those who provided for the needs of their customers 
at the same time they sought to provide for the needs and interests of their employees and 
larger community. 
 
But as a general rule, our society has sought to separate the interests of the company from 
those of community—to place a dividing line between the worlds of the nonprofit and 
for-profit corporation. And this line has clearly been drawn within the foundations of this 
country.  Of the 48,000 foundations active in the United States, fewer than 15% take 
social, environmental, or other non-financial factors into account when managing their 
greatest resource—their financial assets.1   
                                                          
1 As recently reported in the New York Times, “…(F)oundations, especially larger ones, have not been in 
the forefront of the social investing movement.  When it last surveyed its membership in 1997, the Council 
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Within many foundations, staff members who develop and execute strategies for the 
investment of social capital (in this case, grants) have little interaction with those 
individuals who invest the institution’s financial capital (what has historically been 
referred to as the "corpus", although this term is somewhat dated). This separation exists 
despite the fact that both sets of investors work for the same institution, presumably 
pursuing the same social mission. Foundation leadership expects to invest in the creation 
of economic value through financial instruments, and to engage in charity through grants 
and related gifts.  While acts of charity are certainly worthy, an evolving philanthropic 
perspective views grants as a form of capital investment in the creation of social value.  
At present, there is an investment gap between the financial capital that foundations 
invest in economic worth, and the social capital with which, through grants, foundations 
pursue investments in social value.2 This paper attempts to bridge this “capital chasm” 
between financial and social capital by leveraging the two sides in pursuit of a more 
effective realization of their shared goal: Value Maximization.   
 
The following pages explore capital investment and the variety of returns it may 
generate: financial, social, and environmental. We make the following points: 
 
¾ the “best” way to create total value may not be first through wealth accumulation, and 
secondly, through wealth distribution;   
 
¾ a broader framework—the Unified Investment Strategy—that combines capital 
allocations that seek to protect investor assets with investments that support greater 
social and other value should be considered by investors;  
 
¾ such a strategy should not be limited to the obvious areas of community economic 
development and related activities, but should be considered in areas as diverse as 
education, the environment, and cultural arts; 
 
¾ foundations can explore new strategies for achieving the maximum value possible in 
the allocation of their philanthropic and market-rate dollars; and, 
 
¾ there are a growing number of foundations presently applying various aspects of a 







                                                                                                                                                                             
on Foundations found that slightly less than 15 percent screened for any social or ethical consideration. 
Small foundations, those with assets of less than $10 million, were almost twice as likely to do so as large 
ones, those with assets of $100 million or more, according to the survey.” 
2 The distinction between these two approaches to philanthropy is referred to as transactive philanthropy 
versus investment philanthropy. This distinction is explored at greater length in The Nature of Returns, 
available at: http://www.redf.org/download/other/emerson1.pdf.  
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Because this paper raises a number of questions that beg further discussion, we have 
included a series of discussion points and initial commentary. 
 
Finally, since the issues presented in this paper center largely upon one’s understanding 
of fiduciary responsibility and the purpose of foundation assets, an expanded appendix 
presents an excerpt addressing the question of an evolved definition of fiduciary 
responsibility.     
 
Our intent for this paper is less to provide definitive answers than to offer foundation 
boards, staff, and interested stakeholders the opportunity to discuss what remains the 
central challenge of philanthropy: 
 
How do we achieve the greatest social, environmental, and 
financial value from our precious philanthropic resources as we 
strive to contribute to the creation of a better world? 
 
It is to an exploration of this challenge that we now turn. 
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Traditional Perspectives on Capital Formation and Allocation 
 
The traditional approach to financial and social capital3 formation and allocation is quite 
straightforward:  
 
An individual, through talent, effort, and chance, generates an increasingly 
significant amount of personal wealth. These funds are managed with the specific 
goal of building the asset base, while protecting existing capital.  To that end, the 
individual pursues a range of investment strategies, investing funds in various 
equity and debt instruments. As the individual’s wealth increases, he or she may 
shift from personally managing the assets to assigning the assets to professionals 
trained in the effective pursuit of financial asset development and protection.   
 
In time, the individual is approached by two sets of players: charities in search of 
resources, and fund managers attempting to responsibly oversee the ever-
increasing financial base.  Many high-net-worth individuals would like to return 
some portion of their success to the community and society that helped make that 
success possible. Hence, they would like to positively respond to requests for 
charitable support.  Naturally, they would also like to have those funds effectively 
managed.  In short order, the decision is made to create a family foundation 
through which the individual may direct his or her financial resources while at the 
same time protecting his or her own financial interests through various tax 
advantages.   
 
And it is at this point that the divide begins: 
 
One set of players is charged with protecting and growing the foundation’s financial 
assets, while another is charged with giving away what has been allocated for charity.  
Foundation board members and program staff are told what surplus funds are available 
for grant-making, while financial managers sweat to nurture and grow the source that 
generates surplus funds, which may then be given away.   
 
For the vast majority of foundations the amount of funds allocated for annual giving is 
the 5% annual disbursement level set by federal regulation. That amount (including 
foundation administrative expenses) is established as the minimum, but many 
foundations operate as if it were the maximum amount available for support of charitable 
purposes.  This is in large part due to the traditional assumption that the primary fiduciary 
responsibility of foundation trustees is to wisely manage the foundation’s financial assets 
                                                          
3 In this paper, the term “social capital” is used to refer to both civic and financial capital, which, together 
with other capital elements, constitute the Integrated Social Capital Marketplace. For an extended 
discussion of these concepts, their connection to traditional definitions of social capital and how they relate 
to concepts of the Blended Value Proposition and Blended Return on Investment referred to elsewhere in 
this paper, please see “The Nature of Returns: Elements of Investment and the Blended Value Proposition,” 
a Harvard Business School Working Paper available at http://www.redf.org/download/other/emerson1.pdf.  
For now, it should be noted that this paper focuses upon the investment of financial capital to generate 
multiple forms of return and that future papers will explore how multiple types of investment (of financial, 
social and natural capital) may also be considered. 
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so that there will always be additional (and, hopefully, an ever-increasing pool of) assets 
generating 5% returns which may be given away.   
 
Many people who aren't directly involved in asset management of major foundations 
assume that a foundation’s assets consist of a single pot of investments (the "corpus") 
from which the annual 5% is taken to support grant making programs.  In truth, the 
process of foundation asset management is often much more fluid than that.  Indeed, a 
good deal of a foundation’s assets need to be invested in liquid investments (such as 
bonds) in order to provide the cash flow necessary to fund grants and expenses.  
Additionally, many people think these grants and expenses are funded solely from the 
interest and income generated by a foundation’s asset base. While this was once true, it is 
no longer the case.  Most large foundations today focus on total return, and are less 
concerned with whether those returns are generated by dividends, interest, or capital 
gains. Therefore, there really isn’t a corpus anymore, as it has been traditionally 
understood.4  As will be argued in this paper, it is the author’s position that this 
understanding of “total return” should be expanded to include not simply financial 
returns, but social and environmental returns as well. 
 
The entire process as described above is driven in fulfillment of what the board defines as 
its fiduciary responsibility.  This central question of fiduciary responsibility is addressed 
at great length below (page 35), but for now let’s accept the definition as presented 
above: as the responsibility to manage a foundation's financial assets so as to ensure the 
ability to generate 5% annual returns which may then be given away.   
 
This process of capital allocation and management produces two results: 
 
1. Many individuals continue to manage their personal assets with the primary 
goal of providing for their own long-term financial well-being. 
 
2. An additional pool of funds is established with the stated goal of achieving 
some charitable purpose or intent. Yet those funds are also managed with 
the primary measure of successful management defined on financial—and 
not charitable, social, or environmental—terms.  
 
It is worth stating again: 
 
The raison d’etre for the creation of foundations is to create social value—to provide a 
public good not generated by the market. This is precisely the reason why foundations are 
established as tax-exempt entities. And yet 85% of foundations invest their core assets 
with no reference to social value creation.  These foundations measure the success of 
their investments on a strictly financial basis.  Of this 85%, most dedicate only 5% of 
their asset income (the minimum allowed by law) to the pursuit of social value through 
the grants they award. These grants become the sole vehicle by which the foundation 
pursues its social mission.  Therefore, the remaining 95% of the foundation’s assets are 
                                                          
4 The author would like to thank Diana Lieberman of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for her 
input regarding this specific point and related sections of this paper. 
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committed to the goal of creating ever-greater economic value and financial returns, since 
the dominant perspective is that foundations should not spend any of their endowment, 
but only spend those financial returns it generates.   
 
Under this formula, 5% of capital returns is assigned in pursuit of 100% of the 
institution’s larger social mission, while 95% of capital assets is assigned in pursuit of 




Toward a New Perspective on Social Capital Formation and Allocation 
 
If the foundation's intent is simply to perpetuate its own existence while annually 
allocating 5% of its wealth to charity, then this scenario is fine.  And such a strategy may, 
in fact, be precisely what a donor and board of directors intend.  The following question, 
however, must at least be broached: 
 
If a donor receives a charitable tax deduction for the creation of a foundation, and has 
separate investments providing for his or her own long-term financial well-being, then 
shouldn't a foundation’s mission (and the self-defined understanding of fiduciary 
responsibility for its Board) demand greater consideration than the mere protection and 
development of financial value as a means to fulfilling its mission? Put more simply: 
 
Shouldn’t a foundation’s investment strategy seek to maximize not only 
financial value, but social, environmental, and other value as well? 
 
The emphasis on managing funds in order to have additional funds to give away is based 
largely upon our understanding of the role of foundations as charitable gift entities as 
opposed to institutions charged with investing in the creation of social and other value.  In 
order for a foundation to maximize its value, the general understanding of philanthropy 
must shift from one that is transactive (i.e. a form of wealth re-distribution) to one that is 
investment-oriented (i.e. focused upon long-term value created through the application of 
available resources).   
 
At the same time that we need to shift our perspective away from purely financial capital 
and toward other types of capital investment, the opposite extreme doesn't work, either. 
In the same way that individuals of modest means cannot spend their way to wealth, 
foundations interested in maximizing the total return and overall value of their grant 
making cannot only make more and larger grants.  A balance must be struck: foundations 
must complement their philanthropic investment strategies with financial investment 
strategies that leverage the aggregate power of the resources being brought to bear. The 
goal of combining these two strategies should be to create the largest set of overall 
returns possible—both social and financial—to maximize the total value of and total 
returns on the foundation's investments.  
                                                          
5 This point was the subject of an extensive conversation between the author and Allen Grossman of 
Harvard Business School.  The author would like to acknowledge Allen’s contributions to these ideas. 
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In other words, a comprehensive investment strategy is required – a strategy that views 
grant making, asset investment, and institutional debt issuance as three integral parts of a 
holistic approach to applying, and maximizing the impact of, the foundation’s available 
resources.  If an investing institution seeks to create financial, social, and environmental 
value, it should consider pursuing a Unified Investment Strategy focused upon this 
Blended Value Proposition, and should develop metrics capable of tracking its Blended 
Return on Investment.  Other documents explore this concept of a BVP and BROI,6 
however a brief explanation may be helpful.   
 
A core concept in traditional business management is one’s "value proposition" —
namely, in any given business undertaking, what value are you creating for your 
customers and shareholders?  In practice, the performance of any company in pursuing 
this value proposition is tracked by numerous metrics, but is most frequently assessed on 
the basis of corporate profit and shareholder return on investment—which are both 
assessed in strictly financial terms.   
 
Increasingly, however, both nonprofit and for-profit organizations are recognizing that 
their value far exceeds simple financial efficiency and shareholder returns.  Organizations 
create value in a wide variety of forms—economic, environmental, social, etc.—and 
therefore are best thought of as encompassing a Blended Value Proposition that generates 
(and may destroy) a Blended Return on Investment. While an important concept for all 
organizations, the idea of a BVP/BROI is central to tax-exempt financial institutions, like 
foundations, that are charged with the pursuit of social value.   
 




   
                                                          
6 While this paper touches on the concept of both a Blended Value Proposition and Blended Return on 
Investment, a complete discussion of the investment continuum and these ideas is beyond the scope of this 
document. A complete discussion is presented in The Nature of Returns, a Harvard Business School 
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Donor Fund 
Less than 15% of Foundations use SRI to 
guide core financial asset investments  
85% of Foundations invest their 
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value creation, such as:  
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creation and maintenance of ever 
increasing economic value…. 
…while less than 5% of 
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creation of social value 
through grants, PRIs or 
other instruments.
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Economic Investment and Social Returns: 
A Blended Return on Investment Framework 
 
The Problems with Traditional Definitions of Investment and Returns 
 
The goal of applying any resource to any opportunity is always value maximization.  If 
the composite value of an investment is not increased, then the rationale for surrendering 
that capital is eliminated. If we know that a grant’s stated social goal will not be attained, 
then why award the grant to begin with? If we think a business venture will fail to return 
the financial rewards we seek, then why make the investment?  The end goal is always to 
do more and better with the resources available to us.  This fact is not usually up for 
discussion. 
 
The problem is that our measure of value creation—the return on investment—has 
traditionally been defined strictly on financial terms.  But in fact, the value created by 
financial capital also resides at social and environmental levels. As a result of financial 
investment in a small company, for example, jobs may be created; social capital within a 
community may be cultivated by virtue of the presence of the company in the 
neighborhood; and the manner in which the company pursues its business model may 
generate environmental returns that are either positive or negative.  And yet, within a 
traditional approach, the focus is solely upon financial performance. 
 
Let's take a different example. Foundations generally award grants to nonprofit 
organizations on the basis of perceived social impact and value.  For example, a grant 
may be awarded to a community job training program in order to provide transitional 
support and training to displaced workers. A certain number of individuals receive 
training in exchange for the receipt of a program grant of a given amount.  Although the 
challenge of program evaluation is not insignificant, let us assume the program is 
achieving its stated social goals. While achieving these social goals, the organization is 
also creating a host of economic effects seldom taken into consideration by the 
philanthropic investor. These may include specific cost savings for governmental 
programs that no longer provide general assistance to individuals now enrolled in the 
training program. There may be a decrease in emergency hospitalization visits as a result 
of improved health care coverage. There may be a decrease in the number of individuals 
placed in the criminal justice system because of diversion from the street to a job – 
thereby decreasing the overall cost of the criminal justice system.  These are all real and 
measurable cost savings—economic value—created by virtue of a philanthropic 
investment. But such value is frequently ignored by many due to the notion that “this is 
only a grant.” 
 
In sum, grants and other capital support provided to nonprofit organizations have 
economic worth and the potential for financial return; and investments made in for-profit 
corporations generate social and environmental impacts—both those of value and not.  
By limiting our attention to only one form of return (financial), we fail to address an 
entire set of value components that might also be leveraged by our financial investments.   
 
 14
A New Approach: The Blended Return on Investment Framework 
 
The Surplus Potential Value Chart (presented below) illustrates that within the traditional 
definition of investment and return, financial investors are content with the value created 
in the area defined as Net Economic Return. And philanthropic investors look only to the 
social value created by their support, the area defined as Net Social Return. As a result, 
through the use of screens that are predominantly financial or social in nature, a degree of 
unmeasured loss on both social and economic investment is created.  If investors operate 
with a limited focus on either financial or social investment, they “leave surplus value on 
the table,” as it were, and do not leverage the full potential of their investment. Each of 
these areas is comprised of unmeasured, and often unconsidered, aspects of value 
creation—in the one case, economic value, and in the other, social value.   
 
In truth, however, both market-rate and philanthropic investors have the potential to 
capture an additional area of value creation.  This area is that of Blended Return on 
Investments, and represents the potential combined value of both social and economic 
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When the axes of both economic value (VE) and social value (Vs) are considered in 
concert (when the screens of both social and financial value consideration are viewed 
together),the total value of an investment is maximized, and the returns generated to both 
shareholders and stakeholders become blended—including components of economic and 
social value.8 This process of value maximization is depicted in the chart below (Value 




Value Maximization with a Blended Return on Investment 
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By approaching this “value equation” with a commitment to leveraging the greatest 
possible combination of both financial and social value, the returns of all investments—
philanthropic, market-rate, and below market-rate9—are extended.  This combined level 
of return may be thought of as a Blended Return on Investment (BROI) consisting of the 
economic, social, environmental, and other value components that result from the 
investment of capital and other resources. 
 
For example, a regional lumber processing plant has a given economic value based on 
such things as its balance sheet, core assets, sales, and profit. That same company, 
however, might convert to sustainable forestry practices (thereby cultivating natural 
                                                          
8 One should also acknowledge that the two axes may be assigned differing weights or valuations based on 
a variety of factors.  For the purpose of illustration, we will assume an equal weighting in this example, but 
the question of how to assign accurate weighting to various components of the value proposition remains 
an interesting area for future inquiry. 
9 A philanthropic investment is a grant invested in a nonprofit organization with no expectation of return of 
principal, but expectation of social return on investment.  Below market-rate investments are defined as any 
investment made on a concessionary basis. For example, if a standard market rate of return is 8% and a 
loan is extended to an organization at 3%, this is a concessionary rate loan.  Grants, when understood as 
investments in the creation of social value, may also be thought of as concessionary rate capital investments 
that provide 0% financial return to the investor in exchange for the creation of social returns.   
As -VE rotates inward 
with social screens… 
…and VS rotates inward 
with financial measures…
…  the combined value of the
two create a “Blended Return
on Investment” that exceeds the




capital), sponsor a job-training program (developing human capital), or help sponsor a 
local “Festival in the Woods,” (nurturing cultural capital).  This same firm might 
historically have only accessed traditional financial capital in the form of market-rate 
debt and equity. Such capital would allow it to pursue financial returns, and to have its 
performance measured against the single bottom-line of profit performance.  But with 
access to other forms of financial capital (concessionary rate debt and alternative asset 
class equity10), the firm could actually pursue and maximize other components of its 
value proposition well beyond simple economic value.  By the same token, investors also 
have the option of pursuing simple economic value, or of pursuing blended value that 
goes well beyond traditionally defined profit and loss as a measure of return. 
 
Implications of the BROI Approach for Social Capital Market Players: 
The Unified Investment Strategy 
 
The concept of multiple levels of value creation is not altogether new.  In recent years, 
corporate social responsibility, social investing, and social entrepreneurship have all 
gained increasing currency. And each of these notions blends financial value with other 
components of a value proposition.  Whether CEO of a Royal Dutch Shell, executive 
director of a Rubicon Programs11, or head of a community bank, today’s leaders must—
and are—reassessing their understanding of the interplay between the application of 
financial resources and the returns/value generated.12 Furthermore, the general public is 
increasingly taking interest in these discussions as well.  Whether via public statements at 
town meetings regarding the placement of factories, participation in community 
sustainability indicator projects, or participation as individual social investors, a growing 
cross-section of individuals is taking interest in looking “beyond the single bottom-line.”  
Because this paper focuses on the implications of these ideas within the context of 
foundation strategies, however, we now turn our attention to the implications of a 
Blended Return on Investment for philanthropic investors. 
 
For foundations, the concepts of a Blended Value Proposition and Blended Return on 
Investment are put into action through:  
 
9 the overall foundation investment strategy,  
9 the specific type and form of investment instruments used, and  
9 the metrics by which the foundation tracks the performance of its investments and 
overall portfolio.   
                                                          
10 An alternative asset class investment instrument is an asset class that intentionally combines financial 
and social returns as a part of its structure.  For example, the Calvert Foundation offers investors the 
Community Investment Note, a fixed rate debt instrument with principal return, but an interest rate of 0 to 4 
percent.  The actual rate is determined by the investor herself depending upon what level of return and 
social impact she seeks.  Shorebank, the community development bank based in Chicago, offers investors 
certificates of deposit that are slightly below market rate, with the balance being used to support 
community economic development.  In this way such investments represent an alternative to traditional, 
strictly financial return investment instruments. 
11 A social purpose enterprise employing formerly homeless individuals. 
12 The citations regarding socially responsible investing, business practice, and entrepreneurship are vast 
and beyond our ability to include in this paper.  They are available to the reader at any library and through a 
number of web searches.   
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Taken together, these elements comprise the building blocks of a Unified Investment 
Strategy.  A UIS is discussed at length later in this document, but for now may be simply 
defined as an investment strategy that seeks to directly leverage philanthropic 
investments against equity and other market-rate investments in an effort to maximize the 
total value of the portfolio being managed by the foundation.  For a graphic presentation 
of this strategy, please see the chart on page 20.   
 
Below, we consider each of the above three points in turn.   
 
1. Investment Strategy 
 
With regard to investment strategy, the most fundamental implication of the BVP/BROI 
for foundations is that investors come to view their overall investment portfolio as a 
single body of investments—not simply as financial investments on the one hand and 
charitable gifts on the other.   
 
In addition, a foundation board must discuss whether the investment goal of the board is 
to maintain the assets of the foundation in perpetuity, or to apply those resources in the 
most effective and direct manner to leverage the greatest possible total return.  Even for 
boards that feel their fiduciary responsibility is to act as a long-term steward of 
foundation assets, with no decline in financial value if such declines are felt to come as a 
cost of pursuing greater social value, there are still approaches by which the board can 
pursue aspects of a UIS. 
 
Instead of grappling with these complex issues, a board might respond to the questions of 
investment strategy by simply making larger and longer-term grant commitments to 
organizations in which it is already invested. While this action would certainly drive 
additional resources directly into nonprofit organizations, such an approach would bypass 
an important opportunity. The foundation, by making larger and longer-term grants, will 
still fail to use core assets as an additional and leveraged investment vehicle applied in 
concert with its grant making activities in order to fulfill the foundation’s corporate 
mission of maximizing social impact and value.   
 
In addition to viewing one’s investment portfolio as a single portfolio consisting of both 
financial, market-rate investments and philanthropic, non-market-rate investments, a UIS 
perspective also allows investors to move beyond short-term, “profit/loss” measures of 
success to long-term, transformative investing. This investment approach has the 
potential to generate increased overall returns for both a specific foundation investor as 
well as other investors in the marketplace who also maintain investments in the firm or 
fund. A common refrain heard in the funding community is a commitment to 
“leveraging” one’s grants against other funds, (“Matching Grants” being the classic 
example of this approach).  Building upon this idea of leverage, foundations might also 
pursue a strategy for increasing overall portfolio performance and return on investment 
by managing their total capital resources on terms that allow them to assist in 
transforming the corporations in which such funds are invested. They might, for example, 
make equity investments in health related industry firms that promise to create products 
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of great social value, a la The Provenex Fund recently launched by The Rockefeller 
Foundation. The net result of such a strategy is to break down the notion of zero sum 
trade-offs between financial and social interests in favor of a more comprehensive vision 
of maximizing both total overall value and total returns for the investor/stakeholder 
community. 
 
2. Specific Type and Form of Investment Instruments  
 
The application of this new investment strategy may be best executed through a Unified 
Investment Strategy (UIS).  A Unified Investment Strategy is defined as an investment 
strategy that makes use of both philanthropic and core asset investments to maximize the 
blended value of those investments.  As described at length in the balance of this paper, a 
Unified Investment Strategy views grants, below market-rate loans, and market-rate 
equity investing as various tools to be used in the pursuit of a single value proposition—
one that seeks to maximize economic, social and environmental value.   
 




ª Socially Responsible Investment of Core Assets:  Rather than investing assets 
under investment strategies that solely track financial performance, a UIS calls for 
a significant portion of foundation’s assets to be invested in accordance with 
Socially Responsible Investing principles. Socially Responsible Investing 
principles do not mean such assets are expected to perform at significant financial 
deficit to market-rate investments. They simply imply that such funds are invested 
with due consideration of financial, social, environmental, and other criteria.  
 
ª Alternative Asset Classes and Equity Investments in For-Profit Small and Medium 
Enterprises:  The main drivers of job creation and market innovation are found in 
the world’s Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). A foundation concerned with 
the total health of society might identify and invest in SMEs that promise to create 
economic, environmental and social value. Such firms often require capital on 
terms that the mainstream capital market does not provide.  For example, 
mainstream investors are hesitant to see funds expended for the creation of 
management information systems capable of tracking social impact, whereas 
alternative asset class investors may require such systems be in place in order to 
accurately assess the firm’s creation of social value over time.  Foundations 
should therefore participate with other socially responsible investor funds in the 
creation and offering of Alternative Asset Classes (AAC) of investment 
instruments for these types of firms. Such AACs are not structured for quarterly 
or annual profit, but instead are offered based on long-term value investing 
principles.13  
                                                          
13In the case of both SRI investment of the corpus and AAC and Equity Investments for SMEs, foundations 
may choose to manage these investments internally or through intermediary investment vehicles (such as a 
 19
 
ª Philanthropic and Below Market-Rate Investments in Non-Profits, NGOs, and 
Social Ventures:  As a complement to its market-rate financial investments in for-
profit SMEs, a foundation pursuing a UIS views its grant making and below-
market rate capital activities with non-profit firms, nongovernmental 
organizations, and for-profit social ventures as an integral component of its 
overall investment portfolio.  The practice of foundation grant making is well 
known, and is the primary activity of most foundations. While program-related 
investments and other types of below market-rate investments have been with us 
for decades, the total number of foundations engaging in this type of investing is 
still relatively modest in light of the total number of foundations active in the 
United States.  Such investments may be directed toward both non-profit and for-
profit corporations as part of an overall UIS. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“Fund of Funds”).  While this is certainly a broad application of the strategy, such breadth allows the 
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3. Development of “New Metrics” to Track Blended Return on Investment 
 
The traditional approach to evaluating philanthropic investment usually includes an 
assessment of whether or not funds were expended according to plan—but involves 
minimal emphasis on the actual value generated from those funds. This is because for 
many, though not all, foundations, the nature of the relationship is fundamentally 
transactive (Did you do what you said you would do?) and not investment-oriented (What 
value did you create as a result of actions supported by our capital?).  
 
Furthermore, “you can’t eat social returns on investment”—in other words, if the only 
definition of successful asset management is the degree to which a fund manager 
generates or exceeds his or her 5% financial return on investment, any effort to alter this 
definition of success poses problems. It poses problems because many professional 
financial managers are solely responsible for generating additional financial resources 
through effective fund management. Including other components of value beyond 
financial measures may be viewed as detracting from this mission. Therefore, in order to 
successfully implement a UIS, an evolved understanding of value is necessary—and new 
tools by which to track that value creation process must be created. Over the past decade 
the philanthropic community has witnessed an emerging interest in “outcome funding,” 
and a renewed focus on evaluation.  These may be the first small steps toward creating a 
more holistic framework by which to assess the total impact of one’s resources. These 
steps, however, fall short of the larger opportunity before us.   
 
Many for-profit corporations are currently grappling with the challenge of understanding 
those aspects of the firm that stand beyond traditional financial metrics of valuation.  
These lessons can be brought into the philanthropic investment community to help inform 
our processes as well.  Development of these metrics may involve such historic practices 
as social auditing and cost-benefit analysis, as well as sustainable development indicators 
(at both the firm and community levels) and evolving social return on investment 
frameworks.  At this point there are promising approaches, but additional work remains 
to be done.  The absence of an “off the shelf” application is no excuse for avoiding the 
challenge of maximizing the value proposition of foundation assets and investment 
strategies. 
 
If such metrics are to be effectively applied, foundation investment committees will have 
to adopt “the long view”. Committees will have to keep their eyes on the ten-year outlook 
for generating real, blended value as opposed to focusing on quarterly financial 
performance and a “how many grants can we make” approach to both fiduciary 
responsibility and philanthropic practice.  This change will also require the development 
of new capital allocation practices that reflect a more complex strategy of foundation 
asset management. Such capital allocation practices will require simultaneous 
consideration of both philanthropic and market-rate investments as well as development 





Because of the significant changes implied by a UIS, this final section regarding “New 
Metrics” is worth special attention.  As more philanthropic investors depart from 
traditional, charitable grant-making and instead create new, investment-based approaches 
to their work, there is increasing emphasis not only on how best to assess the 
performance and impact of one’s resources, but also on how best to assess the value of 
that performance relative to the specific investment being made. 
 
Initially, individual funders will meet this challenge by grappling with each of these 
questions in turn.  But as these investors explore the creation of better metrics by which 
to assess both organizational and capital performance, these non-profit investors will 
encounter (coming from the other direction!) data and accounting frameworks being 
developed by for-profit investors and managers in the business community who are in 
pursuit of this same Holy Grail—namely, the ability to adequately assess, track, and 
monitor social performance. One of the most exciting developments of recent years, has 
been the emergence of these two schools of inquiry driving toward a common answer to 
the same question:  
 
How do we best assess, track, and value intangibles of the firm—whether 
for-profit or nonprofit; whether the result of capital provided by 
philanthropic or market-rate investors? 
 
As each set of actors explores the answers to this question, there is ample opportunity for 
the creation of independent, third-party “ratings firms” that can document and assess the 
relative performance of activities within various organizations. These ratings firms can 
assign performance rankings to organizations based on the effectiveness with which 
capital is applied in pursuit of the creation of full, blended value—combining economic, 
social, environmental, and a host of other considerations heretofore considered 
“unmeasurable” and intangible for the purpose of accounting or valuation measurement. 
 
As presented in the chart titled “A Unified Investment Portfolio,” (pp. 32) a foundation’s 
financial assets are merely one part of a total strategy of value creation.  In part, the value 
sought is financial and in part it is social/environmental. The key is that invested capital 
is not positioned purely as an individual effort to pursue returns, but rather as an approach 






A Philanthropic Theory of Change and Total Foundation Asset Management 
 
The Basic Elements of the UIS Theory of Change 
 
Any investment strategy is predicated upon the belief that an investment of resources at 
one level and point in time will result in an increase in the value of that investment at 
some future point in time.  One invests $5 today in the belief that such an investment will 
result in a return of $7 in the future.  Philanthropic investors also invest in the hope of 
capturing greater returns tomorrow—but for them, the return sought is not simply a 
financial return, but a blended return consisting of increased assets and changed 
communities, organizations, and society.  Since a UIS is focused on maximizing the 
potential of investments to initiate change in communities, companies, NGOs, and public 
policy, it is important to understand the philanthropic theory of change that influences 
this investment strategy.    
 
The UIS theory of change entails three elements: Pressure, Purpose, and Performance.14   
 
• Pressure consists of compliance with regulatory codes, reporting requirements, 
the specific terms of invested capital, etc.  In this case, individuals receive certain 
tax considerations in exchange for the creation of a foundation.  Most foundations 
disperse their assets on the basis of compliance with the “5% payout rule” 
imposed by the federal government.  The goal of a UIS is to complement this 
compliance with a broader, mission-driven pressure, that of… 
 
• Purpose.  In the corporate context, purpose consists of incentive mechanisms that 
corporations and their managers pursue in order to perform in accordance with a 
larger vision of the firm’s value proposition, culture, and market position.  As 
previously stated, the traditional purpose pursued by managers has been financial 
returns. In this context, however, the incentive of operating within a BVP/BROI 
framework encourages key players in the firm to be market leaders of a different 
sort.  In recent years, increasing numbers of corporations and corporate leaders 
have begun to support corporate practices viewed as “socially responsible”. In this 
sense, they are evolving a broader definition of purpose than that of simple 
financial return to shareholder.  The purpose of a foundation’s UIS is to support 
this evolving shift in perspective with regard to... 
 
• Performance. When combined, external pressure and an internalized sense of 
purpose result in changes in performance.  Performance occurs on internal and 
external levels as the organization and its individual players operate within the 
dynamic context of the firm, market, and society. This new understanding of 
performance is what drives the need for creating the new metrics previously 
described—metrics capable of documenting and tracking the complexities of 
                                                          
14 The author wishes to acknowledge that these three general components are taken from notes made at a 
collective discussion session regarding corporate social responsibility hosted by the Hewlett Foundation in 
May 2001.   
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performance sought by investors in pursuit of a blended return on their 
investments. Without these new metrics, shifts and improvements in performance 
of investments cannot be accurately assessed or valued. This assessment is 
fundamental to one’s ability to determine whether the leverage of one’s 
investment has contributed to the creation of appropriate pressure that helps 
affirm new understandings of purpose—which are then manifest in changed 
performance of managers and the firms they lead. 
 
Within this theory of change, organizational and social transformation occur as part of a 
process whereby individual, NGO, for-profit, and larger, market-based investments are 
all leveraged for the greatest possible effect.  A UIS allows for the simultaneous building, 
affirmation, incenting, and disciplining of financial investments at individual, firm, and 
societal/market-based levels—all in pursuit of the larger vision sought by investing the 
foundation’s total assets.  An organizational counter-part to the UIS is a Total Foundation 
Asset Management strategy. This strategy requires the complete alignment of both 
financial and non-financial assets of the foundation in pursuit of its mission. All the 
resources that can be mustered under total foundation asset management—capital 
investments (both philanthropic and market-rate), intellectual capital, program and 
organizational resources, and all other aspects of the foundations possible activities—are 
positioned to create maximum value for both the foundation and larger society.   
 
While the strategic philanthropy notion of mission alignment is for the most part well 
understood, most foundations view only their grant making activities as their “tool box” 
used to pursue organizational mission.  In truth, the actual grants a foundation makes are 
only a part of the total assets that may be applied to the task.  Equity investment, staff 
expertise, and the foundation’s convening power are all additional assets the foundation 
may use in pursuit of its goals. These are all brought together under TFAM. 
 
The strategic positioning of a Total Foundation Asset Management approach allows 
investors to maximize the leverage and impact of all institutional assets—while enabling 
other actors in the market place to “play off” those investments in order to create yet 
greater overall value for individual investors and society as a whole. This leverage may 
take place in the form of other foundations making philanthropic investments in a given 
venture or “second round” investors participating in a progressive for-profit firm’s next 
round of equity fund raising.  The foundation engages in not only grant making and 
market-rate financial investments, but also in transformative investing whereby the 
foundation’s total assets (both financial and organizational) are positioned in full pursuit 
of value maximization. 
 
Returning to consideration of how financial investments are structured, it is a central 
tenet of a UIS that all philanthropic investments are leveraged against a foundation’s 
market-rate investments.  For example, a foundation might invest in a community finance 
institution that makes loans to corporations pursuing sustainable development 
technologies. At the same time, that foundation also makes grants to NGOs engaged in 
policy and program development to help increase the number of companies engaging in 
sustainable development practices and strategy.  As a result, the foundation’s assets are 
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being applied toward value maximization from several investment angles—both equity 
and grant investments being made in an array of for-profit and nonprofit firms in order 
for the foundation to achieve its total goal for maximizing the total value of its assets. 
The foundation is thereby leveraging its assets to “triangulate” toward a position where 
its assets achieve maximum impact. 
 
While a UIS may most easily be applied in the context of certain program areas—for 
example, sustainable development or community economic development—the general 
concept also applies to education, health-care, and virtually every other area of 
investment application.  This is because the fundamental concept of a UIS is that 
foundations should attempt to leverage all their investments in support of their primary 
mission—that mission being the pursuit of both financial and charitable intent; the 
creation of both financial and social value.  A given foundation may choose to apply such 
an approach either across the board, or within given program areas where it can 
potentially leverage the greatest impact. Let's take, for example, the program area of 
sustainable development. Foundation program officers can manage grants and program-
related investments made to nonprofit organizations seeking new program and policy 
initiatives that are more sustainable for society, while at the same time the foundation can 
make market-rate, equity investments in privately held companies working to bring new, 
sustainable technologies to the marketplace.     
 
 
Investment Instruments within a Unified Portfolio 
  
A UIS is advanced through the use of a variety of investment instruments. The specific 
type and constellation of investments within the portfolio will change depending upon the 
particular investment goals of the foundation in question.  What is presented below is 
only one example of how such a portfolio might be constructed.  The main idea is that 
each instrument has a different level of risk, potential for various types of financial return 
and capacity for creating a variety of social returns. A sample of these possible 
instruments is illustrated in the chart entitled “A Unified Portfolio.” As demonstrated in 
the chart, each of these instruments carries various levels of social risk in the same way 
that financial investments carry different levels of financial risk.15 
 
We will begin by considering three basic types of philanthropic investments (grants):  
 
 Program,  
 Infrastructure, and  




                                                          
15 It should be noted that there are limits to this risk analogy.  For example, while one could conceive of a 
“low risk, high return” social investment, it is harder to advance a financial investment that would also be 
low risk and high return.  By its very definition of risk and reward, financial markets demand that the 
greater the level of risk exposure, the more significant the level of potential financial return demanded by 




Program grants are low-risk investments made in areas that are relatively well understood 
and of which the social impact is clear.  An example of this level of social risk is 
providing grant support to a local soup kitchen.  The intent is to feed a certain number of 
individuals with a certain amount of resources—and the actual number of people fed is 
easy to count.  A philanthropic investment at this level is nearly “risk free,” in that 
$10,000 is guaranteed to buy food for 5000 clients. These types of philanthropic 
investments have little social risk because they are used to cover a specific expense 
(providing a specific service or activity, such as support services to employees with 
mental illness).  There is little risk involved because it is relatively easy to track units of 




Infrastructure investments are less direct, but may be structured to assist an organization 
in increasing effectiveness of service delivery or execution of a certain strategy. One 
example of an infrastructure investment is making a grant to improve the professionalism 
of a community loan fund by providing better staff training, thereby decreasing the 
number of “bad” loans made by the fund. This kind of grant is used to improve the ability 
of a nonprofit to provide its services more effectively and to better manage its business.  
The risk of failure here is higher because infrastructure development is often process-
oriented (it takes a few years to build and manage the infrastructure), so the impact of 




R&D grants represent the greatest social risk. Why? Because they are experimental, and 
returns are derived over an extended period of time. Sometimes those returns are even 
provided indirectly to the investee or investor.  Consequently, the possibility for failure is 
increased, and it may be very difficult to establish a causal relationship between the 
investment and the return. The ability to value that return as a part of this portfolio of 
investments may therefore be more challenging as well. R&D grants might include, for 
example, a “proof of concept” grant to an organization exploring a new intervention 
strategy with high-risk youth—or a grant to an organization engaging in long-term policy 
development thought to be potentially beneficial to a particular community of interest.  
These grants carry higher social risk—but often provide greater social returns in the long 




Financial Value Provided by Each of These Three Grant Types 
 
Each of the grants presented in “A Unified Portfolio” has a component of social value and 
possible return—and each has an aspect of economic value as well.  In the case of 
Program grants, a program grant awarded to an organization focused on providing 
individuals with opportunities to move from welfare to work represents a cost savings to 
the public sector that may be tracked over time and assessed in relation to the total cost of 
providing the funded intervention.16 Infrastructure grants also carry financial benefits, 
such as greater operating and other efficiencies; but these benefits are of greatest value to 
the organization itself and are more difficult to tie directly to a particular investment.  
Having said that, from the investor perspective, an investee that improves efficiency of its 
operations can gain greater impact for each dollar spent, thereby making for a more 
attractive investment opportunity.  While R&D grants may generate real value in the long 
run, in the short-term they have the lowest level of immediate financial value for an 
investor.   
 
While it may be self-evident to some, it should be noted that in the same way each level 
of grant investment moves into greater areas of SROI Risk, each level of investment may 
also be viewed as moving further away from a Risk Free Rate of financial value and 
returns.  The more “experimental” a given social investment is, the less sure one may be 
of its potential benefits and value. 
 
Specific non-grant financial investments also move progressively along a financial and 
social risk continuum from Program Related Investments, Recoverable Grants and other 
concessionary or below market-rate investments, to T-Bills, to Social Value Notes 
(Equity Linked Zero Coupons with an SRI Index Option or such investments as the 
Community Investment Notes offered by The Calvert Foundation17), to Equity and 
Venture Capital investments. Each of these investments has an increasing level of 
assumed financial risk, and an historically decreasing level of defined social value.   
 
It should be noted that both Social Value Notes and Socially Responsible Investing are 
two forms of investing that connect financial and social value creation as defined 
components of a single investment.  Traditional Private Equity Investing and Venture 
Capital Funds, both of which pursue pure financial returns with no enunciated or strategic 
social/environmental return consideration, exist at the extreme of the financial return on 
investment risk boundary, and also stand furthest away from the deliberate pursuit of 
social value.  Note that, while this is historically true, there are a number of emerging 
investment funds that seek to hold themselves accountable for more than just financial 
performance. These funds include Commons Capital, UrbanAmerica, ICV Partners, and 
Genesis LA, among others.  And there are also growing numbers of experienced 
investment advisors, such as Innovest, providing institutional investors with guidance on 
how to maximize the blended value of one’s portfolio. 
                                                          
15 This is the form of SROI analysis known as a cost/benefit analysis. The Roberts Enterprise Development 
Fund has based its SROI Reporting on this type of analysis. And the International Financial Corporation 
(IFC) makes use of a similar method, External Rate of Return, to evaluate investment opportunities. 
16 Please see HBS Working Paper: http://www.redf.org/download/other/social_value_note.pdf 
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The Unified Investment Strategy in Action 
 
Perhaps the best way to understand the possible implications of a UIS for philanthropic 
investors is via the following two hypothetical examples. 
 
Foundation X has been making grants in community development for a number of years, 
and is currently exploring ways to move beyond its traditional grant-making practices.   
The Foundation decides to shift its focus to a UIS. Under this new strategy, the Board 
designates $100 million to be invested over a period of five years, and budgets another 
$50 million to be awarded in grants.  The financial investments are allocated among 
several socially responsible investment funds targeting resources to inner-city business 
development and the creation of affordable housing.  These investments are placed in 
both equity and fixed-rate debt notes.  Concurrent with its capital structured finance 
strategy18, the foundation identifies its “highest value” grantees working in community 
economic development and provides a number of related Program, Infrastructure, and 
R&D grants to those groups.  Foundation finance personnel work directly with program 
staff to “connect” the financial investments with the program investments through a 
shared capital allocation process in order to achieve maximum fund leverage. Finally, 
over this same 5-year time frame, the Foundation works directly with a team of 
academic, business, and nonprofit organizations to develop and apply metrics 
appropriate to its investments and the assessment of the blended value being created.  At 
the close of the investment period, BROI Reports assess capital performance at financial, 
social, and environmental levels. 
 
Foundation Y is interested in sustainable development.  The foundation pursues this 
commitment by approving $100 million in investments and $50 million in grant support.  
In addition, the foundation identifies five bioregions within which it would like to target 
these investments. $50 million of the foundation’s investment dollars are placed in a 
nationally active Socially Responsible Investment fund that targets financial and business 
development to ventures creating sustainable development technologies. The other half of 
the investment is placed in five regional business development equity pools that make 
investments in SME companies engaging in sustainable business practices.  The $50 
million in grant support is targeted to nonprofit organizations operating within each 
bioregion to assist social, public policy, and other activities necessary to support the 
creation of community health indicators, laws, regulations, and policies needed to 
support the expansion of the field of sustainable development.  At the end of the five-year 
period, the Foundation’s investments are assessed on the basis of BROI performance 
metrics. 
 
In both of these cases, the specific details could be fleshed out in a variety of ways.  But 
the important facts are that, first, the investments of the foundation are being applied in 
mutual support of financial and social/environmental value creation in order to achieve 
maximum leverage.  Second, “blended” metrics are being created that seek to capture, 
                                                          
17 A capital structured finance strategy refers to the overall strategy an investor or investee pursues that 
makes use of various types of capital (debt, equity) in various forms (fixed rate/concessionary, high 
risk/low risk, etc.) in order to provide the appropriate mix of capital to achieve the returns one seeks. 
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track, and define this value-creation process.  Over time, as more metrics are developed 
and historical performance is assessed, investors will have greater ability to evaluate, 
invest, and track the returns of their portfolios. For the time being, though, making 
investments on a blended portfolio basis with a commitment to creating “new metrics” 
capable of tracking non-financial returns is a crucial first step. Finally, one must also 
consider whether a foundation’s size may affect its ability to operate within a UIS basis.  
Smaller, family operated foundations may find it difficult to execute such an approach 
without partnering with other funds or working through intermediaries.  Such difficulties 
do not mean smaller foundations cannot use this approach, but rather that they must seek 
out alternative ways to structure their investments in blended value creation. 
 
 
“Real World” Examples of a UIS in Action 
 
It is important to note that while a complete UIS may be the goal, foundations do not 
have to execute a UIS in its entirety to capture at least some of the benefits of such an 
approach. Indeed, a growing number of foundations engage in mission-related investing 
that seeks alignment between a foundation’s market-rate investments and its 
grantmaking.  A UIS seeks to move one step further by viewing the foundation’s assets as 
a single portfolio as opposed to separate elements to be aligned, however there are 
certainly similarities in the two strategies. Foundations may combine various components 
of traditional and alternative investing in order to maximize value from their market-rate, 
below-market-rate, and philanthropic investments. In the future, it will be important to 
present detailed case analyses of those foundations engaging in a UIS. These cases should 
explore lessons learned, details on strategy, performance/return analyses, information 
about issues related to sustainability, and comparisons of how the various investment 
instruments function together to create a Blended Return on Investment for the portfolio 
as a whole. 
 
Although there is currently a lack of such detailed analyses, there are several examples of 
foundations working to apply these types of strategies.  While many in the philanthropic 
community are aware of the historic work of the Rockefeller Foundation and the John D. 
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, for example, other foundation innovators 
should also be acknowledged.  The following three foundations are of particular note: 
 
9  F.B. Heron Foundation: Founded in 1992 with the mission of helping people 
and communities to help themselves, the New York-based F.B. Heron Foundation 
has embraced the vision of becoming a "private community investment trust." As 
conceived by its Board, such a trust would eventually deploy most of the 
Foundation's assets of $265 million in investments that support its mission. The 
resulting endowment would be a mix of market-rate and below-market rate assets, 
fixed-income, and equity. To this end, the Foundation has initiated a multi-year 
process of transitioning toward the creation of a portfolio consistent with this 
strategy. By the end of 2001, the Foundation anticipates that 10% of its total 
assets will consist of such investments.19 
                                                          
19 Information provided by foundation staff. 
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9 Abell Foundation:  In addition to making grants to a variety of organizations in 
the greater Baltimore area, the Abell Foundation earmarks a portion of its core 
financial assets for investment in corporations located in or committed to doing 
business within the Foundation’s target area. In this way, the Foundation’s 
market-rate investment policies reinforce its philanthropic investment practices in 
the region. The Foundation makes direct investments in local firms ranging from 
alternative energy companies, to high-tech firms, to pharmaceutical companies. 
The Foundation also executes part of its strategy through the Abell Venture 
Fund—a separate, professionally managed fund that makes investments both in 
local firms and in those willing to re-locate to the Baltimore area.  Investments 
range from a few hundred thousand to three million dollars.  The Fund presently 
has over $25 million under management.20 
  
9 Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation: The Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation launched 
its strategy for mission-related investing in 1993. While not a UIS per se, the staff 
and board of the Noyes Foundation have been leaders in the area of seeking 
alignment between foundation assets and asset allocation.  As such, it was an 
early leader among those seeking consistency between its investment of 
philanthropic and market-rate capital. The JSN Foundation embraces an 
investment philosophy that leverages its core assets and venture fund investing in 
direct pursuit of its mission.  As stated in the Foundation’s Investment Policy, 
“We recognize that our fiduciary responsibility does not end with maximizing 
return and minimizing risk. We also recognize that economic growth can come at 
considerable cost to communities and the environment. We believe that efforts to 
mitigate environmental degradation, address issues of social justice and promote 
healthy communities should be incorporated as part of business and investment 
decision making. We believe that management, directors, employees, and 
investors should consider these social issues in the pursuit of financial objectives. 
We believe that in light of the social, environmental, and economic challenges of 
our time, fiduciary responsibility in the coming decades will dictate the 
integration of prudent financial management practices with principles of 
environmental stewardship, concern for community, and corporate accountability 
to shareholders and stakeholders alike.”  To fulfill this vision, the Foundation 
seeks “to invest our endowment assets in companies that provide commercial 
solutions to major social and environmental problems; and/or include concerns for 
environmental impact, equity and community.”21    
 
As these and other foundations continue to execute their strategies, they will provide 
unique opportunities for others to learn from those experiences and for others to apply 
this new knowledge to their own foundation investment practices. 
                                                          
18 Information taken from the Abell Foundation’s web site: www.abell.org.  















































































Questions for Discussion: 
Implications of a Unified Investment Strategy 
For Social Investors 
 
The preceding pages present a framework for investing in the creation of blended value. 
They also raise a number of questions, including:  
 
1. What is the true nature of a foundation’s fiduciary responsibility? 
 
The appendix to this paper includes an excerpt that addresses the concept and issue of 
fiduciary responsibility in some detail.  Readers are encouraged to peruse this excerpt and 
to reflect on the larger issues raised:  What constitutes fiduciary responsibility in the 
context of a foundation trustee?  Is the pursuit of financial return and asset protection 
adequate? Does fiduciary responsibility include the responsibility to maximize the pursuit 
of social value?  How is that best done and is there the opportunity to increase that value 
by leveraging both the foundation’s financial and program investments? 
 
2. While adequate metrics exist to quantify and measure financial value, social value 
remains largely unaddressed.  Is it possible or prudent to invest in the absence of defined 
metrics by which SROI may be assessed and tracked? 
 
How are investors to track the creation of social value?  Where does traditional program 
evaluation leave off and “new metrics” begin?  Do organizations (both investor and 
investee) have adequate operating MIS in place to track agreed-upon new metrics?  What 
is the process by which a portfolio can assess its performance on a blended basis?  Must 
all metrics lend themselves to some level of monetization in order for them to be 
compared with traditional financial performance metrics? 
 
3. If a fund is committed to investing on a blended basis, how are capital allocation 
decisions made? 
 
What are the allocation rules or decision criteria used to maximize blended returns on 
investments that involve diversified financial and social instruments? What are the 
appropriate levels of diversification in order for a fund to maximize its blended value 
while simultaneously protecting assets and minimizing risk?  Should investment 
decisions be made by a committee consensus, or by the application of strict, numeric 
scoring? 
 
4. What are the organizational requirements necessary to pursue a Unified Investment 
Strategy? 
 
Such a major shift in the terms of engagement may require more sophisticated operating 
MIS, more engaged and active fund management, and the development of appropriate 
risk measures.  How is this best achieved? How much would the foundation itself 
require?  How much could be outsourced and at what point would the foundation know 
the appropriate infrastructure was in place?    
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The implication of a Unified Investment Strategy will entail a shift in thinking on the part 
of foundation trustees regarding the concept of fiduciary responsibility.  Traditionally, 
many have viewed the fiduciary responsibility of board members as being primarily a 
question of financial responsibility and oversight—not a definition of fiduciary 
responsibility that includes social, environmental and other elements of portfolio 
performance.  Therefore, the following excerpt is included to address the concept of 
fiduciary responsibility and foundation boards.  The author would like to thank United 
Nations University for permission to reproduce the following material. 
 
New Concepts of Fiduciary Responsibility22 
By 
Edward Tasch 
and Stephen Viederman 
 
Rate of return, liquidity, diversification, emerging markets, hedging, derivatives, asset 
allocation: the business of today's institutional asset manager seems as remote from 
global warming and ozone holes as mahjongg is from gene mapping. 
 
The notion that financial institutions might play a role in steering business toward 
sustainability is, to be sure, quixotic. To most financiers, it is downright wrongheaded. 
Consider, for example, the remarks of two contemporary financiers, whose views are 
more the norm than the exception. The first, a noted Wall Street investment banker who 
is also widely known for his environmental interests, gave a 1990 commencement 
address about lessons learned from the Exxon Valdez spill, after which he took questions 
from the audience: 
 
Q. You have spoken eloquently about corporate responsibility and the need for 
better federal regulation, but you have said nothing about the role of Wall Street. 
Don't investment banks and financial institutions have a role to play in shaping 
corporate policy, in transmitting investors' concerns regarding the environmental 
impact of corporate activity? 
 
A. Absolutely not. One of the cornerstones of free markets is efficient capital 
markets. It would be inappropriate, inefficient, or worse to attempt to layer 
concerns about environmental impact onto financial intermediaries, who are 
singularly focused on the task of providing corporate access to capital on the best 
possible terms and upon whom the efficient functioning of capital markets 
depends. 
 
The second institutional investment manager, responsible for many hundreds of millions 
of dollars of institutional venture capital portfolios, made the following remarks 
during a conversation: 
 
                                                          
19Reprinted with permission from: Steering Business Toward Sustainability, Fritjof Capra and Gunter Pauli, 
eds., Copyright 1995 by the United Nations University. All rights reserved. 
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As a fiduciary, I have a moral obligation to my investors to maximize return and 
minimize risk. I simply cannot take into account exogenous factors like social or 
environmental impact, or I will reduce the opportunity set and thereby reduce the 
rate of return. 
 
Such constructs of the roles and obligations of financial intermediaries and fiduciaries 
have arisen with a certain inevitability over the past two hundred years, ever since Adam 
Smith originally formulated the concept of an "invisible hand" through which each man 
striving only to better himself would, through a thriving free market economy, improve 
standards of living for all. After tracing how these views have developed and their 
context in contemporary financial markets, we will describe how one small financial 
institution, the Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation, is trying to construct for itself a new 
definition of fiduciary responsibility. 
 
The Prudent Man 
 
In 1830, a Massachusetts court offered a definition of prudence that has, through decades 
of subsequent re-examination and re-definition, survived in the canon of fiduciary 
responsibility as "the prudent man rule": 
 
All that can be required of a trustee to invest is, that he shall conduct himself faithfully 
and exercise sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and 
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the 
permanent disposition of their funds, considering probable income, as well as the 
probable safety of the capital to be invested.1 
 
This describes a narrow form of "sustainability," which persists among fiduciaries today: 
sustainability as maintenance and growth of financial capital, sustainability as growth of 
assets sufficient to keep pace with inflation and preserve or even augment purchasing 
power. The concept of prudence, built around risk aversion, predictability of income and 
preservation of capital, came to define a whole culture of managing "other people's 
money." In the mid-nineteenth century, such a definition of sustainability was 
understandably devoid of a whole range of concerns that had yet to be articulated. But in 
the late twentieth century, our knowledge regarding environmental degradation and the 
social problems which persist in the wake of economic growth and rising standards of 
living should impel us to ask the following questions: 
 
     •Can there be fiduciary responsibility without incorporating questions about the social 
and environmental impacts of economic growth? 
     • How do concepts of fiduciary responsibility affect corporate culture? 
     • What is the relationship between fiduciary responsibility and institutional or 
corporate responsibility? 
     •Can institutional investment management be an effective agent for change? 
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Sustainability, as maintenance or restoration of ecological integrity, provision of 
economic security, and protection of popular participation in the life of a community, 
takes on a new meaning. 
 
The Question of Scale 
 
The contemporary fiduciary cannot easily factor such issues into his/ her decision-
making, due in part to the very scale of modern financial institutions and their role in 
global capital markets. Consider the following items, which evidence the staggering 
growth of financial institutions and capital markets: 
 
     • Private pension fund assets in the United States grew from about $250 billion in 
1975 to $2.5 trillion in 1994. 
     • The State of California's public employee pension fund grew from $13.3 billion in 
1979 to $80 billion in 1994. 
     • In 1990, nearly a hundred portfolio management organizations managed more than 
$10 billion, and the ten largest managed $800 billion of financial assets of the roughly $5 
trillion in stocks, bonds and real estate owned by institutions. 
     • Volume on the New York Stock Exchange increased from 767 million shares in 
1960 to almost 36 billion shares in 1986 and to the 70 billion range in 1993. From 1982 
to 1992, trading increased tenfold in Tokyo, twelvefold in Frankfurt and thirty fold in 
London. 
     • In 1960, annual turnover (shares traded as a percentage of total tradable shares 
outstanding) on the New York Stock Exchange was 12 percent. Turnover rose to 64 
percent in 1986, but when the activity which now occurs on regional exchanges, in the 
over-the-counter market and in foreign markets is taken into account, the consolidated 
trading in Exchange-listed stocks in the U.S. and abroad produced a turnover of 87 
percent. 
     • Derivatives and synthetics - futures, warrants, swaps and scores of newly engineered 
financial products - have created multi-trillion dollar markets, many of which have 
doubled in a single year. In 1992, the value of swap contracts equaled the combined 
worth of the New York and Tokyo stock markets. Annual international volume of equity 
index derivatives in 1992 exceeded $10 trillion. 
     • Pre-tax profits of U.S. brokers and investment banks reached a record $8.9 billion in 
1993. 
 
As financial markets explode, intermediaries and transaction-based incentives 
increasingly influence corporate decision-making and the flow of capital. Increasing 
complexity of financial instruments and global markets drives increasing specialization of 
financial managers. Fiduciaries seem more removed than ever from the social and 
environment consequences of their decisions. "Most of the time," writes leading 
investment banker Felix Rohatyn, "the product being bought or sold only exists on a 
computer screen or as an electronic impulse on a magnetic tape.... The movements of 
capital and the paper economy related to it used to be the result of industrial and 
commercial activity; now they are the cause."2 
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When transactions come first, the consequences on individuals and community can be 
devastating. Commentator Adam Smith describes how most financiers never see the 
effects of their decision-making: 
 
A worker may work for the same company for twenty years. A manager may live in the 
community, support its schools, and work to integrate the company and the community. 
But the owner reigns supreme; it is up to him whether the plant is shut down, the worker 
laid off, the manager sent somewhere else. Yet the owner these days is seldom the 
founder with the big house up on the hill. Technically, the owner (or at least one of the 
owners) is probably a pension fund or mutual fund, represented by a young portfolio 
manager who shares neither history nor loyalty with the company and who will sell out in 
five minutes if that will improve his track record. Or the owner may even be a group of 
arbitrageurs seeking the fastest return possible on a very swift turnover - measured in 
hours, not in months or years.3 
 
The implications for those concerned with the social and environmental impact of 
business are daunting. Whither, amidst the torrent of financial activity and the divorce of 
portfolio managers from people and places affected by their decisions, the concept of 
sustainability? 
 
Asset Management and the Behavior of Business 
 
So long as assets are viewed as passive pools of income-generating securities, fiduciary 
responsibility ends with a diversified asset allocation plan and the selection and 
monitoring of money managers. Yet some institutional investors have taken in recent 
years a first step towards a more proactive definition of fiduciary responsibility, one 
which recognizes that their investment expectations can and do impact corporate 
behavior. 
 
The Council of Institutional Investors, whose membership includes roughly eighty of the 
nation's largest public employee and union pension funds, focuses attention on corporate 
governance and the problem of boards of directors failing to adequately represent the 
financial interests of shareholders. In particular, the Council has vigorously attacked 
distorted compensation packages for senior management of many corporations: "High 
pay is not the same as pay for performance and may not, in fact, improve performance," 
noted the Council's April, 1994 newsletter. "Compensation can be tied to performance 
without giving away the store. And giving away the store pursuant to a formula still 
leaves one without a store." 
 
The California Public Employees Retirement System (CALPERS), one of the nation's 
largest institutional investors and an active Council member, has been a leader on issues 
of corporate governance. Most recently CALPERS has included issues of workplace 
conditions and employment practices in their annual governance reviews as "one of many 
other considerations ... in our investment decisions."4 
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Such initiatives mark the beginning of a process of integrating into investment decision-
making factors that have previously been considered beyond the purview of financial 
analysis. How does a $10 million CEO compensation package affect employee morale? 
How does a CEO's "independent wealth" affect his/her attitude toward and loyalty to the 
corporation? Will directors who are paid $40,000 per annum in fees act with sufficient 
independence to effectively oversee senior management? Will corporations with broader 
employee participation in ownership or decision-making enjoy a competitive advantage? 
These are questions about compensation and governance, specifically, and, more 
generally, about corporate culture. 
 
Assistant Secretary of Labor Olena Berg, the former Chief Deputy Treasurer of 
California who currently oversees the regulation of the U.S. pension industry, believes 
that a broader view of investor responsibility is inevitable for pension funds. "We will be 
asking pension funds to change their thinking," Berg says. "Instead of thinking only 
about beating the market by another increment, we want them to think about how their 
investments are contributing to the long-run health of the economy ... Given the size of 
the funds, it doesn't make sense to try to beat the market for a quarter. When you are the 
market, as the funds are, you can't beat it. The goal should be an overall lifting of the 
economic boats by investing in ways that are economically productive and create more 
and better jobs." (New York Times, August 10, 1993.) 
 
The role of financial institutions in steering business toward sustainability begins with 
such steps. Concerns about corporate governance and the creations of long-term benefits 
to the economy as a whole mark evolving concepts of "prudence" towards broader 
investor responsibility and the inclusion in investment decision-making of factors 
previously beyond the purview of financial analysis. 
 
Nevertheless, the connection between the long-term health of the economy and the social 
and environmental costs of economic growth remains problematic for fiduciaries. 
Institutional investors have been very slow to embrace "social investing," or strategies, 




Economically Targeted Investing 
 
While most financial institutions have been reluctant to pursue social investing through 
stock and fixed-income portfolios, some have, however, pursued "economically targeted 
investments" (ETIs) in their private or alternative investments. While lacking a single, 
standardized definition, ETIs have been defined by the Center for Policy Alternatives as 
"any prudent investment that fills a capital gap in an under financed area of the economy 
and earns a risk-adjusted market rate of return." Aiming to produce competitive returns 
and targeted social benefits, ETIs have included small business loans, venture funds 
dedicated to minority-owned businesses, and mortgage pools for low-cost housing.5 
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The Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association (PERA) targets more than $850 
million, or about six percent of its total assets, to economic development investments in 
Colorado. PERA invests $75 million through Colorado Housing and Finance Agency 
bonds to finance fixed-rate, long-term small business loans in Colorado. Since 1992, the 
California Public Employee Retirement System has committed $375 million for single-
family housing construction when traditional financing sources withdrew from the 
market. By the end of FY 1992, CALPERS had invested $5.6 billion, or over seven 
percent of total assets of $77 billion, in investments classified as ETIs. 
 
As of September 1993, the twenty largest U.S. public pension funds had invested more 
than $23 billion in ETIs, with roughly 85 percent going to mortgage-related investments 
and the remainder in venture capital, private placements, or other direct investments. 
 
Despite these initiatives, however, nine out of ten pension funds responding to a 1994 
survey conducted by Institutional Investor magazine indicated that they felt ETIs were 
not consistent with their fiduciary responsibility to secure the greatest financial returns 
for their beneficiaries. Nearly three-quarters of survey respondents were corporate 
pension funds. 
 
For those who have pursued ETIs, various financial and social measurements have been 
used to evaluate performance. Massachusetts measures its small-business-loan securities 
against 90-day Treasuries. The GE pension fund expects an economically targeted 
mezzanine fund to beat the S&P 500 by 300 basis points. As for social benefits, 
yardsticks include number of new homes under a certain price level or jobs created within 
a defined geographical area or within a particular population. 
 
But questions regarding rate of return, performance benchmarks, measurement of social 
benefits, and possible trade-offs between financial and social returns continue to prevent 
many institutional investors from pursuing either ETIs or from choosing money managers 
who pursue social investment strategies. 
 
http://www.noyes.org/admin/concepts.html 
